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ESSAY
LEGAL SCHOLARS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY
OF INSTITUTIONS
Ron Harnst
INTRODUCTION
This Essay does not focus on legal theory in law schools, the com-
mon core of legal scholarship as practiced in law schools, nor the
trend towards interdisciplinary research as reflected in the "law and"
movements in law schools. Rather, it looks outside of law schools, law
reviews, and internal legal discourse. It examines the role that legal
scholars play in interdisciplinary debates on legal issues. Do they at-
tend such debates, and if so, do these scholars offer a unique voice
based on legal theory or on other tools or sensitivities provided by the
legal discipline?
The last three decades have witnessed an institutional turn in the
social sciences. While the turn was manifest in political science, his-
tory, and sociology, its strongest hold was in economics. Economists
turned their attention from markets to institutions, including legal in-
stitutions. The institutional turn, which was mostly due to the influ-
ence of Nobel Laureate Douglass North, had historical inclinations.
Attention turned to the development of impersonal exchange in pre-
state settings, to the rise of states that credibly respect property rights,
and to the evolution of market infrastructures. The award of the
Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 to Elinor Ostrom, a political scien-
tist, and to Oliver Williamson, a professor of business, economics, and
law, suggests that the institutional turn is still vibrant and challenging
traditional disciplinary boundaries.' This Essay raises the notion that
scholars from other disciplines, particularly economics, have taken the
t Professor of Law, Faculty of Law; Director, The David Berg Institute for Law and
History, Tel Aviv University. I would like to thank Chantal Thomas and the participants at
the conference "The Future of Legal Theory" for their advice, assistance, and thoughtful
comments. I would also like to thank Hila Ohayon for her excellent research assistance.
I See Press Release, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Prize in Economic Sci-
ences 2009 (Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/
laureates/2009/press.pdf. The Academy awarded the Prize to Elinor Ostrom "for her anal-
ysis of economic governance, especially the commons" and to Oliver Williamson "for his
analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm." Id.
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lead not only in the study of the impact of legal and institutional fac-
tors on economic outcomes but also in the study of the development
of legal institutions. Is this another manifestation of the imperialistic
tendencies of economics to study and explain disciplines? Is this an-
other example of the pragmatism and openness of the discipline of
economics, of its willingness to study and borrow from other disci-
plines? What can we learn from this experience about the future pros-
pects of legal scholarship?
In this Essay, I will discuss three debates that have much in com-
mon yet contain sufficiently different characteristics to highlight dif-
ferent types of interplay. All of the debates began with a contribution
by leading economists. They all touched on law and on problems that
interested legal scholars. They all arose more than a decade ago. 2 In
fact, all of the original contributions were published between 1989
and 1998. This provided legal scholars with sufficient time to compre-
hend the debates and to respond to them as they found them rele-
vant. The articles that sparked these debates were all frequently cited
and highly influential. They became canonical works in the field of
economics and had a significant impact on other social science
disciplines.
The first debate focuses on an article by Avner Greif that deals
with the apparent irrelevance of the law in situations in which lawyers
would consider the law determinative. The second debate focuses on
an article by Douglass North and Barry Weingast that claims that law is
important but shows that it can only function together with other in-
stitutional factors. The third debate focuses on an article by Andrei
Shleifer and his coauthors (collectively known as LLSV) that demon-
strates that the law determines economic outcomes. To be clear, insti-
tutional economics in general, these three examples, and my claim in
this Essay are all confined to positive scholarship.
My own inclination toward historical studies affected the selec-
tion of the examples and narrowed the implications inferable from
them. I leave to other authors the task of discussing the interplay be-
tween the legal discipline and other disciplines with respect to con-
2 According to Fred Shapiro, economist Ronald Coase's earlier contribution, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960), is the most frequently cited legal article. See
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 751, 759
(1996). In fact, the number of citations to Coase's article (1741) is almost twice the num-
ber of citations to the second most cited legal article. See id. at 767. I have discussed
elsewhere the twist that Coase's contributions took in the legal discipline, particularly in
law and economics, compared to his original agenda in economics. See Ron Harris, The
Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21 LAw & Hisr. REv. 297, 300, 300-05
(2003); Ron Harris, The Uses of History in Law and Economics, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
659, 663-64 (2003). I did not choose Coase as one of my examples because his contribu-
tion is much older than the three I selected and is also less historical. Additionally, I have
already discussed it elsewhere.
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temporary issues, normative and prescriptive topics, and the research
and debates about these issues and topics. This Essay will first present
each of the three debates in terms of their content and impact. It will
then analyze the legal responses to the debates in the same order.
Finally, it will offer some observations about the state of legal scholar-
ship and legal theory as reflected in these debates.
I
REPUTATION AND COALITIONS
The first example I consider is Avner Greif's contribution to the
study of agency relationship. Greif's first contribution to this field was
Reputation and Coalitions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders, published
in 1989.3 In the five years that followed, he published a series of re-
lated articles in leading economics journals.4 In 2006, he integrated
his project into a book.5 He received a MacArthur Foundation Fellow-
ship (Genius Grant) in 1998 and is currently a professor of economics
and the Bowman Family Endowed Professor in Humanities and Sci-
ences at Stanford University.
His contribution in Reputation and Coalitions was to show how ap-
propriate informal institutions can solve agency problems between
merchants and their overseas agents.6 This solution worked well de-
spite difficult cultural, geographic, and legal background conditions.7
Greif specifically noted that the legal system failed to provide a frame-
work to organize and enforce agency relationships and contracts.8 In-
itially, there was a significant information asymmetry between the
agent who traveled abroad and the principal that remained at home.9
The functioning of the informal institution was not explained by altru-
ism associated with family, ethnic, or religious affinity.10 It was also
3 Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi
Traders, 49 J. ECON. HisT. 857 (1989) [hereinafter Greif, Reputation and Coalitions].
4 Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 Am. ECON. REV. 525 (1993) [hereinafter Greif, Contract En-
forceability]; Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994); Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organiza-
tion ofSociety: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102
J. POL. EcON. 912 (1994) [hereinafter Greif, Cultural Beliefs]; Avner Greif, Institutions and
International Trade Lessons from the Commercial Revolution, 82 AM. EcoN. REV. 128 (1992);
Avner Greif, On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa
During the Twelh and Thirteenth Centuries, 54 J. ECON. Hisr. 271 (1994). Greif's canonical
articles were reprinted in various collections and were published in adapted versions in
political science and sociology journals.
5 AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN EcONOuv- LESSONS FROM
MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006).
6 Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 3, at 858-60.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 865-66.
9 Id. at 864-65.
10 Id. at 859.
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not explained by the repeated dealings between principal and agent
that typically give rise to reputation-based enforcement."
The solution was the coalition, a self-enforcing institution that al-
igned the interests of agents and principals.12 Membership in the coa-
lition required each member to provide, for the benefit of all
members, information on market conditions and on all agents and
transactions (even transactions conducted by other merchants and
their agents).13 Membership also required inflicting multilateral pun-
ishment on agents that cheated other members in the coalition.14
Though the common social background of members in the coalition
facilitated the flow of information, it was not in itself the source of
obedience by agents.' 5
Greif's contribution could be relevant to lawyers because it shows
the conditions under which the law is irrelevant or redundant. Specif-
ically, without institutions that facilitate an expected flow of informa-
tion, the law cannot enforce agency contracts because legal
institutions alone cannot guarantee an appropriate flow of informa-
tion. Greifs coalition, however, could impose sufficient sanctions
without resorting to the legal system or to the state. Moreover, ostra-
cism from a close-knit society or expulsion from an essential and ex-
clusive marketplace, such as a fair or a port, was not the only available
sanction. Crucially, the system did not rely on a third-party verifier or
enforcer. It was the first-best solution, not a solution of last resort that
replaced a malfunctioning legal system. Table 1 demonstrates the im-
pact of Griefs contribution by showing the number of academic cita-
tions to three of Greif's primary articles (Contract Enforceability and
Economic Institutions in Early Trade; Coordination, Commitment, and En-
forcement and Reputation and Coalitions) by year and discipline as re-
corded in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).16
II
CONSTITUTIONS AND COMMITMENT
The second example I consider is the contribution of Douglass
North and Barry Weingast to research on "credible commitments," be-
11 Id. at 866-67.
12 Id. at 867-68.
13 Id. at 879-81.
14 Id. at 870.
15 Id. at 867.
16 See Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 4; Greif, Cultural Beliefs, supra note 4;
Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 3. For the purposes of this Table, note that an
article that cites all three Greif articles is counted three times in the chart. For information
about the coverage and methodology of SSCI, see Social Sciences Citation Index, THOMSON
REuTERs, http://thomsonreuters.com/products services/science/science-products/a-z/
social sciences_citation index (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
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ginning with the publication of their article Constitutions and Commit-
ment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-
Century England in 1989.17 When they wrote the article, North was a
professor of economics and Weingast was a professor of economics
and political economy. They both taught at Washington University in
St. Louis. North won the Nobel Prize in Economics four years later;
Weingast moved to Stanford, where he is a professor of political sci-
ence and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institute.
A statement of purpose for a retrospective "credible commit-
ment" bidecennial conference held in Cambridge in 2010 stated:
Douglass North and Barry Weingast's seminal article on "credible
commitment" has proven the most influential explanation of the
economic and financial significance of the Glorious Revolution of
1688/89. They argued that the establishment of parliamentary
supremacy over public finance created an environment in which in-
vestors could rely upon the state to meet its financial promises. The
Financial Revolution, upon which Britain's rise to great power status
was founded, followed from this development.18
This statement demonstrates North and Weingast's contribution
that the British solved the credible commitments problem through
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the measures that followed it.
The solution allowed measurable and dramatic changes on several
connected levels that included an increase in government borrow-
ing,19 lowering of interest paid by the government on its debt,20 an
expansion of the government bond market and private capital mar-
kets,2 ' Britain's ability to wage prolonged and successful wars, 22 and its
17 Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution
of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HisT. 803
(1989). The number of reprints and the titles of the collections in which they were pub-
lished can serve as a good indication of the canonical status of the article and its discipli-
nary boundaries. Their article has appeared in the following collections: 1 THE ECoNOMICs
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 236-65 (Svetozar Pejovich ed., 2001); EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE 134-65 (Lee J. Alston, Thrdinn Eggertsson & Douglass C. North eds.,
1996); INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 384-413 (Kevin E. Davis ed., 2010); 1
MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 311-43 (Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini eds., 1994); THE
POLTIcAL ECONoMY OF INSTrrUTIONs 263-92 (Claude M6nard ed., 2004); 4 RATIONAL
CHOICE POLITICS 297-325 (Torun Dewan et al. eds., 2009); REGULATION 115-44 (Colin
Scott ed., 2003); 1 TRANSACTION CoSr ECONOMICS 254-83 (Oliver E. Williamson & Scott E.
Masten eds., 1995).
18 D'Maris D. Coffnan & Anne L. Murphy, Background, QUESTIONING 'CREDIBLE COM-
MITMENT': RETHINKING THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE RISE OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM,
http://www.srcf.ucam.org/-ddc22/credcom2010/background/background.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2011).
19 North & Weingast, supra note 17, at 805.
20 Id. at 823.
21 Id. at 825.
22 Id. at 823.
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ability to form the fiscal-military nexus.23 The solution marked the
beginning of a century and a half of continuous and unprecedented
economic growth. 24 Countries such as France, which were unsuccess-
ful in solving the problem, remained muddled.25
The implications of the credible commitments framework go be-
yond the Glorious Revolution and the market for state bonds, which,
for North and Weingast, serve only as an important case study. A
strong and unconstrained state cannot credibly commit to refrain
from expropriating from its creditors. The ability to expropriate is a
curse, not a blessing, to a despotic state: it cannot borrow. On a more
general level, a predatory state cannot commit to refrain from expro-
priating property of any sort. The more likely a sovereign is to expro-
priate, the lower the expected return on its investment and the lower
its incentive to invest. The impact of the credible commitments
framework beyond the history of the Glorious Revolution is evident in
the pattern of its citations as reflected in SSCI.26 Table 2 shows that,
although North and Weingast's article was cited 54 times in history
journals, it was also cited 214 times in economics journals, 121 times
in political science journals, 21 times in sociology journals, and 49
times in law journals.
Though North and Weingast portray their project as dealing with
the political factors underpinning economic growth, they, in fact,
place law in the center. The factors are the rules governing economic
change, the institutions that enforce the rules, and the institutions
that govern the way these rules may be changed. These rules and in-
stitutions are legal and constitutional.
The British solved the problem of credible commitments partly
by redesigning their constitution to limit the power of the state.27
Specifically, they weakened the Crown by shifting power to Parliament
through the Bill of Rights and by establishing a constitutional monar-
chy. Additionally, they required parliamentary assent to taxes and
loans.28 Through Acts of Parliament, they ensured loan repayment by
earmarking taxes to be used for repayment of specific loans.29 How-
ever, the British constitution was not paramount or entrenched, and
the empowered Parliament could still expropriate by way of legisla-
tion. The British needed additional shackles, so they formed institu-
tions that would counterbalance Parliament-most notably, the Bank
of England. The Bank administered the national debt of Britain, en-
23 Id. at 830-31.
24 Id. at 828-32.
25 Id.
26 See Social Sciences Citation Index, supra note 16.
27 North & Weingast, supra note 17, at 831.
28 Id. at 804.
29 Id. at 821.
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suring that bondholders would be repaid through tax revenues and
protected from expropriation.30 Interest groups of politically power-
ful investors that organized around the Bank and other financial insti-
tutions clustered around Parliament and the Crown, lobbying and
restraining them to prevent the State from defaulting and expropriat-
ing.3 1 Three constraints-constitutional government, banking institu-
tions, and interest groups-prevented the state from expropriating
and ultimately made its commitments credible.
III
LAW AND FINANCE
Andrei Shleifer, a professor of economics at Harvard University
and formerly a professor of finance at the University of Chicago, along
with his coauthors (in most articles a four-author team widely known
as LLSV), published a series of articles between 1997 and 2002.32 The
most famous of these articles are A Survey of Corporate Governance,33
Legal Determinants of External Finance,34 Law and Finance,35 and Legal
Origins.3 6 Some of these articles won distinguished prizes shortly after
their publication, and Law and Finance is ranked third among all arti-
cles and papers in IDEAS RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) by
the number of citations discounted by citation age.37 In 1999, the
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Schliefer's coauthors were Robert Vishny, a professor of finance at the Booth Busi-
ness School; Rafael La Porta, a former professor of economics at Harvard and now a pro-
fessor at the Tuck School of Business; and Florenico Lopez-de-Silanes, a former professor
at the Kennedy School of Government and the Yale School of Management and now a
professor of law and economics at the Ecole Normale Supdrieur.
3 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737
(1997). Their article appears in the following collections: 1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 20-66
(Kevin Keasey et al. eds., 1999); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE FINANCE: A EURO-
PEAN PERSPECTIVE 52-90 (Ruud A.I. van Frederikslust et al. eds., 2008); 1 CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REPORTING 95-141 (Niamh Brennan ed., 2008); LAW AND
EcoNoMic DEVELOPMENT 305-51 (Hans-Bernd Schafer & Angara V. Raja eds., 2006); 2 RE-
CENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE FINANCE 135-81 (Jay R. Ritter ed., 2005); 3 RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 399-445 (Robert D. Cooter & Francesco Parisi eds.,
2009).
34 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
35 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcoN. 1113 (1998). Their article appears in the following
collections: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HoRsr ALBACH 26-68 (Joachim
Schwalbach ed., 2001); THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT COMMON LAw 513-555 (Paul H.
Rubin ed., 2007); 2 GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 285-327 (Diane K. Denis
&J. McConnell eds., 2005); LAw AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 33, at 193-235.
36 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002).
37 Top I % Research Items, IDEAS: ECONOMIC AND FINANCE RESEARCH, http://ideas.
repec.org/top/top.item.sdiscount.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011). It is ranked in the top
ten items in several other categories. The repository includes more than 900,000 papers
and articles.
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American Economic Association awarded Shleifer the John Bates
Clark Medal, the most prestigious award granted to economists under
the age of forty. He is currently the most-cited economist, with 11,254
citations.38
LLSV developed a system for coding and measuring the legal
rules that govern the protection of outside investors in corporations.
They then showed that the legal rules that protect investors vary sys-
tematically among legal traditions, or legal origins. LLSV found that
common law countries provide the most protection, German-based
and Scandinavian civil law countries provide a medium level of protec-
tion, and French civil law countries provide the least protection."9
They then correlated these levels of protection with economic out-
comes and found that legal origins explained the ownership structure
of corporations, firm valuation, extent and liquidity of the stock mar-
ket, and eventually, economic development.40 They argued that be-
cause the law in most countries was transplanted by colonial powers,
its causal direction is not in doubt.4' Specifically, developed econo-
mies did not adopt common law systems; common law countries, on
the other hand, developed sophisticated economies due to their legal
origins.4 2 Through their influential series of articles, LLSV convinced
nonlegal scholars that law matters. In fact, the first to pick up this
message, as reflected in Table 3 below, were finance scholars, econo-
mists, business and management professors, and only more slowly and
to a more limited extent, legal scholars.
IV
LEGAL SCHOLARS AND REPUTATION AND COALITIONS
Most of the references to Greif in the legal literature are in law
and economics journals and law and society journals. Economists and
sociologists make some of these references, mostly by way of applica-
tion of Greif's models to nonlegal contexts. This application is to
agency relationships and other contracts that operate subject to infor-
mation asymmetries and show that reputation mechanisms, private or-
38 Schleifer is ranked out of twenty-four thousand registered authors. Economist Rank-
ings at IDEAS, IDEAS: ECONOMIC AND FINANCE RESEARCH (Feb. 2011), http://ideas.repec.
org/top/top.person.nbcites.html#psh93. He is ranked second (afterJoseph Stiglitz) in av-
erage rank score, as calculated based on several rankings. Id.
39 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 34, at 1132.
40 Id. at 1132-33.
41 Id. at 1115-16.
42 Id.
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dering, social norms, and social networks govern such relationships
and enforce breaches. 4 3
A notable exception to this trend is Barak Richman. 4 4 His work
on the intersections of legal, institutional, and market enforcement
relies on Greif's model and extends it by formulating a positive model
that predicts when commercial parties will employ private ordering to
enforce their agreements. 4 5 He identifies factors that determine the
use of firms, courts, and reputation-based private ordering to control
agency relationships. 46 Richman demonstrates that legal scholars did
not utilize Greifs contributions in a sophisticated way in their own
disciplinary concern.
In March 2008, Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie, two Cam-
bridge economists, posted their working paper Contract Enforcement,
Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised online. 47
The paper created heated controversy in the economic and legal
blogosphere. It argued that the case of the Maghribi traders did not
fit Greifs interpretation 48 and that the Maghribis instead used formal
legal mechanisms.49 Edwards and Ogilvie argued that the Geniza doc-
uments, the basic primary source Greif used to support his argument,
actually reveal that these traders made widespread and voluntary use
of the formal legal system by resorting to the Jewish law system and
occasionally to the Muslim legal framework.50 They further argued
that there is no evidence for the existence of traders' coalitions.51 Ul-
timately, they contended that Greif had not identified a case of infor-
mal reputation- and coalition-based enforcement but rather a familiar
case of legal enforcement.
43 See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 345, 354-58 (2003); John
McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Pivate Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH.
L. REv. 2421, 2426-27, 2433-34, 2456-57 (2000).
44 Lisa Bernstein is another example. She studied privately drafted commercial codes
and arbitration tribunals in the diamond and cotton industries, yet her contributions were
initially independent of Greif's. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MicH. L. REv. 1724 (2001).
45 Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive The-
ory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2328, 2337-51 (2004).
46 Id.
47 Jeremy Edwards & Sheilagh Ogilvie, Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capi-
tal: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised (Cambridge Working Papers in Econ., Paper No. 0928,
2009), available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0928.pdf. The
paper was initially posted on SSRN as a CESifo working paper and later posted online as a
Cambridge working paper.
48 Id. at 5.
49 See, e.g., id. at 19.
50 Id. at 21.
51 Id. at 56.
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In June 2008, Greif responded in Contract Enforcement and Institu-
tions Among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie by posting
his response along with the original criticism on his Stanford web-
site.52 He examined Edwards and Ogilvie's evidence that the
Maghribis resorted to the legal system and argued that they had mis-
read the Geniza records.53 They presented nonagency-related mat-
ters, nontrade-related matters, and even matters that could only be
performed through court orders, such as inheritance and family court
orders, as evidence for the resort of agents to the legal system. Greif
carefully reexamined all 745 merchant letters in the relevant corpus
of the Geniza and found only three documents reflecting disputes in-
volving agency relations and only one that did not involve a non-
Maghribi.5 4 Several bloggers found Greif's response persuasive and
agreed that he had proved that his critics had misinterpreted the
evidence.66
The main conclusion that I draw from this exchange is that law-
yers were clearly absent. Two economists argued that the law mat-
tered-and that was only two decades after Greif's initial contribution.
Similarly, doctoral students connected to the Geniza Project at
Princeton University have conducted constructive and interesting
studies of the interplay between the legal system and informal systems
in the era of the Geniza in recent years.5 6 Legal historians and legal
scholars of private ordering were strikingly absent. They were not in-
volved in the historical line of research and did not take part in the
controversy. With the exception of Richman, mentioned above, and
possibly a couple of other legal scholars that my survey may have
missed, legal scholars did not contribute to the theory, the modeling,
or the examination of these case studies. Now, after the outbreak of
the controversy and following the recent research by historians, it can-
not be argued that this lack of interest resulted from the irrelevancy of
the topic to lawyers due to the absence of formal law.
52 Avner Greif, Contract Enforcement and Institutions Among the Maghribi Traders:
Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie (June 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/-avner/Greif-Papers/SSRNAUG202008.pdf.
53 See id. at 2.
54 See id. at 5. Because it is not relevant to this Essay, I will not discuss Greif's response
regarding the existence of coalitions and the evidence for the existence of multilateral
reputation-based enforcement within these coalitions.
55 See Henry Farrell, Greifv. Edwards and Ogilvie, THE MONKEY CAGE (June 9, 2008, 4:29
PM), http://www.themonkeycage.org/2008/07/greif-vedwards and-ogilvie.html.
56 See Phillip Isaac Ackerman-Lieberman, A Partnership Culture: Jewish Economic
and Social Life Seen Through the Legal Documents of the Cairo Geniza, 12-74 (Nov.
2007) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University), ProQuest, Doc. ID
1417804981; Jessica Goldberg, Geographies of Trade and Traders in the Eleventh-Century
Mediterranean: A Study Based on Documents from the Cairo Geniza, 200-08 (2005) (un-
published PhD dissertation, Columbia University), ProQuest, Doc. ID 1059994911.
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V
LEGAL SCHOLARS AND CONSTITUTIONS AND COMMITMENT
Turning to North and Weingast's scholarship on credible com-
mitments, lawyers should be interested in this work because it pro-
vides a new understanding of a significant event in Anglo-American
constitutional history: the Glorious Revolution. Lawyers should be in-
terested in it because it offers a new framework for understanding the
role of constitutions as credible commitment devices and their effect
on markets, interest rates, and eventually economic development.
Moreover, they should be interested in it because it demonstrates how
legal and constitutional factors combine with institutional and politi-
cal factors with meanings that cannot be understood when divorced
from these factors.
Legal scholars, however, do not exhibit this interest. Legal schol-
arship frequently mentions the phrase "credible commitments" with-
out explicit reference to North and Weingast's articles and without
awareness of the specifics of their analytical framework or case study.57
Legal scholars often only take the general notion that sovereigns en-
counter a credible commitments problem. They do not examine
whether sovereigns apply the full set of tools identified by North and
Weingast, a combination of constitutional, institutional, and political
tools.5 8 It is no coincidence that only one lawyer (myself) presented
at the recent four-day conference that revisited the credible commit-
ments thesis.5 9
A notable exception is a 2006 book by Kenneth Dam entitled The
Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic Development.60 Dam is
a professor emeritus of law at the University of Chicago, a former Dep-
uty Secretary of State, a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, and
a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute. In The Law-Growth Nexus,
he explicitly acknowledged the influence that new institutional eco-
nomics, and North in particular, had on his book and policy recom-
mendations. 61 Much in line with North and Weingast, he devoted a
chapter to the legal and constitutional evolution that enabled the Glo-
rious Revolution and the impact of that revolution on economic
57 By my own count, there are 133 references to the article on LexisNexis and 89 on
Westlaw. The term "credible commitments" appears 891 times in LexisNexis and 558
times in Westlaw.
58 See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, Sovereignty, Credible Commitments,
and Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations, 51 J.L. & ECON. 641, 641-42 (2008);
Robert K Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, The Origins of Democracy: A Model with Application to
Ancient Greece, 49 J.L. & ECON. 115, 117-18 (2006); Neil Fligstein &Jennifer Choo, Law and
Corporate Governance, I ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 61, 74-76 (2005).
59 For the conference site, see Coffman & Murphy, supra note 18.
60 See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWrH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (2006).
61 See id. at 2.
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growth. 62 Interestingly, he also included a lengthy discussion on the
legal origins literature and some reference to Greifs contribution.63
A recent review of this book, coauthored by a law professor and a
business school professor, and published in a leading economics jour-
nal, epitomizes the growing interdisciplinary discourse. 64
VI
LEGAL SCHOLARS AND LAW AND FINANCE
In The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, published in 2008 in
the Journal of Economic Literature, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (without Vishny) consolidated their main findings, offered an
overall interpretation of these findings, and addressed the objections
raised over the previous decade to their legal origins thesis.65 As this
Essay does not aim to evaluate the validity of their thesis, I will not
examine the substance of their response. Instead, I will use it to un-
cover which of the objections came from legal scholars and whether
these scholars used a theory or a perspective that is peculiarly legal.
LLS's references include quite a few legal scholars. 66 These are divisi-
ble into two groups. The first group of references is to the literature
that predated their project. It includes exclusively comparative law
scholars. This observation suggests that comparative law scholars did
not respond to LLSV or at least did not respond in a manner that
LLSV found relevant. I will get to them below. The second group
includes scholars that responded to the LLSV project. It primarily in-
cludes corporate law scholars from the law and economics branch.
Legal scholars can be found throughout the survey and are mixed
with economists and finance scholars. This suggests that legal schol-
ars launched criticisms of various types, indistinguishable from criti-
cism coming from other disciplines.
Some argued that external nonlegal underlying factors, rather
than legal origins, might explain LLSV's modern legal outcome. For
example, Mark Roe claims that the destruction inflicted by World War
II can explain continental political radicalization that in turn led to
hostility to financial markets and weak legal protection for investors.67
Daniel Klerman and his collaborators conclude that the different out-
62 See id. at 70-90.
63 See id. at 26-55.
64 See Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel, Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based on Ken-
neth Dam's Analysis of Legal Traditions in The Law-Growth Nexus, 47 J. ECON. LIr. 781
(2009).
65 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Conse-
quences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008).
66 See id. at 327-32.
67 See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARv. L. REv.
460, 513-15 (2006).
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comes can be explained by colonial origins at least as well as by legal
origins. They assert that the apparent common law advantage LLSV
uncovered may result either from the full colonial package imple-
mented by British rulers in their colonies, including governance, in-
frastructure, and education, or from the fact that the British, as the
most powerful colonial power, picked up territories that, due to their
natural endowments, size, or position, ended up performing better
economically.68 Amir Licht and his collaborators conclude that differ-
ences in culture better explain the differences in law than legal ori-
gins.69 In fact, all of these legal scholars say that the law does not
matter at all.
Other legal scholars have argued that strong investor protection
in common law countries is a recent phenomenon. For example,
Brian Cheffins argues that Britain still had weak protection for inves-
tors in the early twentieth century after it experienced its prolonged
and unprecedented economic growth.70 Additionally, Daniel
Klerman and Paul Mahoney examined the historical evidence and
claim that common law courts were just as centralized as the French
courts and that common law judges were not more independent until
the eighteenth century.7' Thus, the differences in the legal system
that LLSV view as explaining the divergent economic outcomes were
not present at the origins. This type of criticism is in fact more histori-
cal than legal. It challenges LLSV's argument by pointing to its static
and ahistorical approach.
Several legal scholars offered criticism from a more legal perspec-
tive. Several legal scholars have argued that by their methodological
need to code and quantify legal rules for comparative purposes, LLSV
ended up focusing on the clear rules found in statutes and neglected
or mistreated the complications, nuances, and contradictions of
judge-made rules.72
Roe has argued, to the contrary, that corporate law and securities
regulation in common law countries were mostly statutory rather than
judge made.73 Furthermore, Roe asserted that the jury, one of the
unique features of common law, which for LLSV explained the diver-
68 Daniel Klerman et al., Legal Origin and Economic Growth 23-28 (Apr. 30, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
69 Amir N. Licht et al., Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance, 25 her'L REv. L. & ECON.
229, 240 (2005); Amir N. Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and
Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. EcoN. 659, 668 (2007).
70 Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the
United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 483-84 (2001).
71 Daniel Klerman & Paul Mahoney, Legal Origin?, 35 J. Comp. ECON. 278, 279-80
(2007).
72 See id. at 290-91, 310.
73 Mark J. Roe, juries and the Political Economy of Legal Origin, 35 J. Comp. ECON. 294,
295-96 (2007).
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gence, was irrelevant in most corporate law litigation.74 Thus, corpo-
rate law was not part of the common law core of the legal system and
not an outcome of its legal origins.
Another strand of criticism, suggested by Howell E. Jackson and
Roe, as well as by John Coffee, holds that the level of enforcement of
the rules, rather than the rules' content, can explain differences in
economic outcomes. This enforcement is measured by budget and
staffing levels, which presumably have nothing to do with legal
origins.7 5
Beth Ahlering and Simon Deakin argue that LLSV's analysis of
the effects of corporate law in isolation is misconceived.7 6 They argue
that in continental Europe, more liberal and contractual labor law de-
veloped earlier than in common law countries. This law was comple-
mentary to corporate law, and the combined effect of the law that
governed capital and the law that governed labor was more similar
than the apparent effect of corporate law when examined in isolation.
Similarly, Nuno Garoupa and his coauthor argue that LLSV's
methodology "cherry-picked" a few corporate law doctrines for the
econometric analysis without any good theoretical justification.
Garoupa argues that contract law and property law are more funda-
mental to any legal system; the hypothesis that rules in these fields of
law impact economic growth is equally conceivable.7 7
Katharina Pistor and her coauthors call attention to the legal
transplant effect.78 They find that the mode of transplantation better
explains economic outcome than the legal origins of the current legal
system. Internally developed law provides better economic outcomes
than law received from other countries. A law that was voluntarily re-
ceived by an independent state provides better outcomes than a law
that was imposed by a colonial power. A law that was carried by immi-
grants that were already familiar with it provides a better outcome.
Pistor argues that the transplantation process has better explanatory
74 Id. at 299-301; Roe, supra note 67, at 479.
75 John C. Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 36-37 (Ctr. for Law &
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 304, 2007); Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and
Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence 8 (Harvard Univ. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 0-28, 2009; John M. Olin
Ctr. for Law and Bus., Working Paper No. 638, 2009).
76 Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal
Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?, 41 LAw & Soc'v REV. 865, 866-69 (2007).
77 Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gomez Liguerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Com-
mon Law, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming Summer 2011) (manuscript at 22-23), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674170.
78 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development,
Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 166-68 (2003); Katharina Pistor
et al., Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries, 18 WORLD
BANK REs. OBSERVER 89, 90-92 (2003).
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power because it reflects the level on which the legal rules are under-
stood, internalized, and implemented.
As mentioned above, LLS, in their 2008 article The Economic Con-
sequences of Legal Origins, referenced the comparative law literature
only as the basis upon which they built their own law and finance anal-
ysis. Significantly, they did not identify any criticism worth mention-
ing by comparative law scholars on that analysis. Indeed, for a decade,
comparative law scholars totally ignored and rejected the law and fi-
nance literature.79 Ironically, comparative law scholars ignored LLSV,
even though LLSV had repeatedly and visibly called attention to com-
parative law, a subdiscipline in search of a methodology and an audi-
ence. 0 Recently, this disregard ended.
In 2009, the American Journal of Comparative Law, the most promi-
nent comparative law journal in the United States, broke the silence
with a theme issue featuring six articles on the intersections of com-
parative law and legal origins. In the article that opened the theme
issue, Ralf Michaels noted that the silence has three negative conse-
quences.8 ' First, economists will continue to ignore comparative law-
yers in the sense that from the comparative literature, they will
selectively pick some basic stylized facts but will not engage in dia-
logue. Second, comparative lawyers will miss the opportunity to assess
the progress of their field and the promises and shortcomings of an
interdisciplinary focus. Third, silence means that comparative law as a
field remains (or increasingly becomes) irrelevant for political
projects because others better positioned to influence policymaking
on the national and transnational levels discuss more and more of its
themes.
The University of Toronto Law Journal also devoted an issue to a
similar theme in 2009. Its title was "Focus: Economics and Compara-
tive Law." The editor was Catherine Valcke, and four contributions
followed her introduction. 8 2 This is another indication of the poten-
79 See, e.g., Mathias M. Siems, Comparative Law: Who Is the Elephant in the Room?, 12
EDINBURGH L. REv. 334, 335-36 (2008) (reviewing COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin
Oriicfi & David Nelken eds., 2007)). In this short book review, Siems calls attention to the
fact that Comparative Law: A Handbook, as well another handbook and an encyclopedia that
were both published in 2007, ignored Rafael La Porta (a proxy for LLSV), the most fre-
quently cited comparativist.
80 See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA
L. REv. 1025 (1999); 0. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 LAw Q.
REv. 40 (1966); Basil Markesinis, Comparative Law-A Subject in Search of an Audience, 53
MOD. L. REv. 1 (1990). But see Mathias Siems, The End of Comparative Law, 2 J. Comp. L.
133, 143-44 (2007).
81 See Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business
Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 Am. J. COMP. L. 765 (2009).
82 Catherine Valcke, Introduction to Focus: Economics and Comparative Law, 59 U. To-
RONro L.J. 179 (2009). The contributors to this special "Focus Feature" included John
Reitz, Ralf Michaels, Pierre Legrand, and Gillian Hadfield.
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tial relevance of the legal origins literature to legal scholars and for
the late response to the challenge by comparative lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Economists might conclude, based on the three examples dis-
cussed in this Essay, that economists took the lead in the positive study
of legal institutions, their development, and function and that other
disciplines, the legal discipline included, only utilize and apply the
innovations offered by economists. Legal scholars, on the other hand,
might conclude that these three examples demonstrate that econo-
mists make contributions that are irrelevant to legal scholarship. They
might find that the economists' contributions are based on unrealistic
assumptions, simplistic data gathering, or historical research, and
thus, are too superficial. They might find them too historical or too
positive. They might find the theoretical basis and the policy implica-
tions as too promarket. They might find that the economists' contri-
butions are inclined towards favoring Anglo-American solutions and
the common law model, or they might simply find them too mathe-
matical, formal, and incomprehensible.
These three examples might be unrepresentative. Indeed, the
Coase Theorem provides a striking counterexample, but it is over fifty
years old.83 I could not think of a later example of such a massive
resort of economists to legal issues or of legal scholars to economics. I
am not in search of examples of contributions in economics, such as
game theory or behavioral economics, that are not particularly related
to law and that made their way into economic analysis of the law as an
addition to its set of analytical tools. I believe that the three examples
in this Essay represent a wider trend. I tend to view the examples as a
demonstration of the development of sites of interdisciplinary and
cross-disciplinary discourse.
The intensity and value of the discourse varies among the exam-
ples. The first two examples-Greif's Reputation and Coalitions and
North and Weingast's Constitution and Commitment-demonstrate the
development of sites within the social sciences in which sociologists,
political scientists, and historians converse with economists. Legal
scholars, though making courteous reference to these canonical arti-
cles, have so far missed most of the potential for engaging with these
contributions and with the social scientists who debate and apply
them. The third example-LLSV's Legal Origins-is particularly in-
triguing. Legal scholars are well represented in this debate in two
ways. One way is through contributions that are not uniquely legal
but are highly relevant and well received. This means that they take
83 See Coase, supra note 2.
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part in the discourse on equal terms, even econometrically, with econ-
omists and finance and management scholars. Another way is
through contributions with a uniquely legal voice. These contribu-
tions bring into the debate the details of the rules, the enforcement
procedures, the interaction with other fields of law, the effects of legal
institutions, the knowledge of legal history, and the dynamics of legal
change. They do not bring a coherent body of legal theory but in-
stead bring perspectives, knowledge, and sensitivities.
For the contribution of the legal discipline to these emerging in-
terdisciplinary sites of debates to be both viable and meaningful, more
legal scholars have to be aware of them, be willing to take an active
part in them, and bring to these sites a willingness to engage with
other disciplines on their own terms, addressing the concerns and in-
terests of those disciplines. Legal scholars should resist the tempta-
tion for expecting quid pro quo. They should not condition their
willingness to engage with the contributions of economists on the will-
ingness of economists to resort to legal scholarship. Rather than view-
ing economists as imperialistic, they should celebrate the fact that
economists and finance scholars finally realized that the law matters
and recognized its significance by awarding the Nobel Prize to institu-
tional economists that take the law seriously. At the same time, to
maintain their relevance and their ability to contribute, legal scholars
have to bring to these new interdisciplinary debates a unique legal
voice, not necessarily a legal theory, but definitely legal perspectives,
sensitivities, and knowledge. A major challenge for positive legal
scholars in the near future will be to find ways of reconciling these
seemingly contradictory challenges.
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APPENDIX
I extracted the data for Tables 1-3 from the Social Sciences Citation
Index@ (SSCI). SSCI is a multidisciplinary index to the journal litera-
ture of the social sciences. It fully indexes over 1,950 journals across
50 social sciences disciplines. It also indexes individually selected, rel-
evant items from over 3,300 of the world's leading scientific and tech-
nical journals.
I produced the data in the tables using ISI WEB OF KNOWLEDGE. I
clicked "all databases," searched for the applicable article, clicked the
article's name, clicked the option "view all citing articles," and clicked
the option "analyze results." I also selected "analyze by subject area."
From this procedure, I obtained a list of the articles that cited the
original article and sorted it by subject area. I then clicked the disci-
plines I wished to present in my tables (for example "economics") and
then selected "analyze the results for that discipline by publication
year." I performed these searches in May 2010.
The main categories I analyzed in this Essay are defined as follows at
http://science.thomsonreuters.com/mjl/scope/scopessci/.
Category Name: Business
Category Description: This category covers resources concerned with all
aspects of business and the business world. These may include mar-
keting and advertising, forecasting, planning, administration, organi-
zational studies, compensation, strategy, retailing, consumer research,
and management. Also covered are resources relating to business his-
tory and business ethics.
Category Name: Business, Finance
Category Description: Business, Finance covers resources primarily con-
cerned with financial and economic correlations, accounting, finan-
cial management, investment strategies, the international monetary
system, insurance, taxation, and banking.
Category Name- Economics
Category Description: Economics covers resources on all aspects, both
theoretical and applied, of the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of goods and services. These include generalist as well as
specialist resources, such as political economy, agricultural econom-
ics, macroeconomics, microeconomics, econometrics, trade, and
planning.
Category Name- History
Category Description: The History category in Social Science covers re-
sources that are primarily concerned with political, social, and eco-
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nomic history. This category also includes history resources that focus
on a particular group, country or geographic area.
Category Name Law
Category Description: Law covers resources from both general and spe-
cialized areas of national and international law, including comparative
law, criminology, business law, banking, corporate and tax law, consti-
tutional law, civil rights, copyright and intellectual property law, envi-
ronmental law, family law, medicine and the law as well as psychology
and the law.
Category Name- Political Science
Category Description: Political Science covers resources concerned with
political studies, military studies, the electoral and legislative
processes, political theory, history of political science, comparative
studies of political systems, and the interaction of politics and other
areas of science and social science.
Category Name. Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary
Category Description: Social Sciences, Interdisciplinary includes re-
sources with an interdisciplinary approach to the field such as studies
on social sciences and computers, time and society, evaluation prac-
tice, black studies, information science and society, homosexuality
studies, childhood studies, and death studies.
Category Name: Sociology
Category Description: Sociology covers resources that focus on the study
of human society, social structures, and social change as well as
human behavior as it is shaped by social forces. Areas covered in this
category include community studies, socio-ethnic problems, rural soci-
ology, sociobiology, social deviance, gender studies, the sociology of
law, the sociology of religion, and comparative sociology.
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